How The Western Democracies Can Survive This Century

The 21st century is becoming increasingly dangerous and unstable as Pax Americana recedes, from the war in Ukraine to the wider threat to the global rules-based order posed by the rise of authoritarianism, the Western way of life is under existential threat. The UK in particular which enthusiastically embraces the defence of Western values, albeit while trying to spend as little as possible, is faced with the challenge of waning American commitment to NATO which has been the UK’s ultimate guarantee of safety since the Suez crisis. There is an increasing risk that a future isolationist president could withdraw the USA from NATO entirely. Equally worryingly, the prospect of European allies such as France electing authoritarian, pro-Russia, and anti-NATO leaders such as Marine Le Pen within the next decade, is no longer inconceivable. This threat of an unravelling of the Atlantic alliance even as Russia ruthlessly, if incompetently, attacks a European nation should be taken seriously by the British Government which must prepare Britain for these worst-case scenarios. It and the public in general must value defence appropriately, and Britain must be ready to stand alone or with an alliance of the willing to defend the West in Europe and beyond. While the UK has made tentative steps to enhance its defence posture, it is astonishing that a peacetime defence budget is still viewed as appropriate by the British Government. However, contrary to the perception of the western media, the UK remains strong with an advanced if overstretched military, sovereign bases around the world at key choke points and an advanced economy. It is by choice that it spends the NATO minimum of around 2% of GDP on defence, and there is an encouraging amount of space in which to expand it. The UK, as a spoke in the current American hub-and-spokes model of Western alliances should ultimately be prepared to become a pillar of the west in its own right. By focusing on expanding the Royal Navy and RAF the UK can once again become a global naval power which could secure the sea-lanes on which we depend, and match Russian and Chinese ambitions away from their own shores, while keeping threats away from our own. Furthermore, by building on existing alliances of like-minded nations such as with the Joint Expeditionary Force or forging new alliances such as by combining the navies of the CANZUK nations into fully integrated fleets, the UK and its allies can outmatch authoritarian regimes, even without an isolationist USA. Ironically, the less dependent the UK and Europe is on the USA, the less likely the USA is to leave the NATO alliance as stronger allies are of more use to the Whitehouse, a formal CANZUK alliance would also have greater bargaining power over the USA than the individual nations alone. The challenge for the major parties in parliament is to educate the British public of the threat to their way of life and to start valuing defence as much as they do health and education. We can afford to defend the Western way of life and the rules-based-order in a multipolar world, but we must choose to do so. 

Overview 

As the United States, increasingly inwards-looking and distracted with domestic issues, steps back from its role of world policeman, and the increasingly likely possibility of returning to its pre-WW2 policy of isolationism, the UK must be willing to step up and lead like-minded nations to stand up to authoritarian regimes, alone if necessary. Contrary to the perception within the Western media which often portrays Russia and China as unstoppable juggernauts based purely on the size of their armed forces on paper, even as Russia fails to defeat or even win air dominance over a much smaller neighbour, the UK and other Western nations are entirely capable, should they wish, to bring their strength to bear to keep these adversaries at bay, it is regrettably by choice that they remain unwilling to do so. The UK, France and Germany, each individually have a larger economy, and arguably each has larger and more advanced industrial base than Russia. Each alone could match Russian aggression and together, even without American support, should be able to outmatch Russia. It is by choice that they fail to commit the resources needed to guarantee their own and their neighbours' security as they hold on to the post-Cold War peace dividend. A significant risk facing the West is that the European nations could give up the proxy fight with Russia and appease Putin out of an unjustified defeatism. While much of the Western media views the strength of the Western world from a perspective of total dependency on the United States, in effect weaker than the sum of its parts, it is largely by choice that the UK has accepted a supporting role in NATO to the American lead. Indeed, Professor Justin Bronk in his recent commentary in RUSI, made a strong case for Europe to ramp up production of the munitions needed to ensure its own security and to continue to support Ukraine even with weakening US resolve and highlighted the need to gain public buy in for increasing military spending.  

The current hub-and-spokes model of Western defence where the United States is at the centre of several complementary alliances covering much of the globe, outmatches any of the individual challenges to Western Hegemony and secures the seas for global trade. However, this model is entirely dependent on the American willingness to lead and is too vulnerable to shifts in US leadership and public opinion. These “spokes” particularly the UK must be able to demonstrate that they can operate without American participation in war and hold back the advance of authoritarianism. Moreover, as the capability gap between the United States and its adversaries narrows the hub-and-spoke model will inevitably lose relevance. As the world becomes multi-polar the current spokes must themselves become pillars of the Western World to provide resilience and stability and some existing members of the western alliances may need to be excluded if their integrity is questionable, for example Hungary. As well as the impetus for Europe to prepare to deter Russia without American support, British leaders should also be asking uncomfortable questions of whether the UK is willing to deter Russia without the support of the key European members of NATO, namely Germany, France and Italy, with populist far right and pro-Putin parties gaining ground in each of these countries. Should American commitment to NATO end and these groups gain power in Germany, France and Italy, the concept of a unified Atlantic deterrent to Russia may also end. A suitable back-up for the UK in Europe could be the strengthening of its existing commitment to the Joint Expeditionary Force, effectively an appendage of NATO, and the growing European land power, Poland. The JEF consists of proactive north European nations with technologically advanced militaries with the will to resist Russia, while Poland’s military is expanding rapidly in response to Russian aggression and is on course to make Poland NATO’s primary land-based military power in Europe. The UK should be prepared to stand with its JEF and Polish allies in Europe with a new collective defence agreement in the worst-case scenario of NATO collapse due to US and Western European pull-out. 

The adversaries of the West, specifically Russia and China, base their foreign policies on the long game, and both seek to undermine and weaken the collective resolve of the West, isolate individual nations and to salami slice the Western world, betting on a lack of military response. Irredentist China and Russia seek to turn the clock back to a time of Sino-centrism and the Russian Empire respectively, and the collapse of the current global order would make this a possibility with the negative consequences to human rights and prosperity that both would bring. Other revisionist powers in the world would also seek to expand into the vacuum that would be left behind from the fall of the West, for example Turkey which pays lip service to NATO while holding neo-Ottomanist ambitions. The uncomfortable truth for the UK, is that it must prepare for the possibility of events in the next decade with the worst possible outcome on Britain and build up the resilience to maintain our way of life. These are the USA withdrawing its guarantee of defence for Europe, climate change-induced crises at home and abroad, the closing of global maritime trade routes, France or Germany electing a pro-Putin or anti-NATO government as has already happened in Hungary, and the EU and/or NATO collapsing. The UK, uniquely amongst the major powers of NATO and the EU, enjoys largely cross-party alignment in foreign policy, in support for Ukraine’s fight against Russia, and in maintaining a minimum defence posture including a nuclear deterrent. Therefore, the UK Government and the major political parties, should collaborate on foreign policy planning, outside of the normal 5-year cycle of elections, to ensure the common good and the defence of the nation. This commentary does not intend to pre-suppose how such resilience building would be resourced, but it should be highlighted that the UK currently allocates the NATO minimum of 2% of its GDP on defence, which currently provides a range of high-quality capabilities in almost every aspect of defence, albeit in limited quantities. If the UK Government, political parties, and public can agree to recognise the value of defence, the demise of the peace dividend and increasing the defence budget significantly, it is entirely possible to grow the UKs strength and influence and reduce the comparative threat of Russia and China’s militaries. There is evidently sufficient room for growth in defence spending, but the difficulty will be gaining consensus on where the funds will come from in existing budgets, or new taxes. Regrettably, as demonstrated by the war in Ukraine where teachers and nurses are fighting on the front lines against the imperial ambitions of Vladimir Putin and where hundreds of schools and hospitals have been destroyed in Russian bombing, defence must be valued as highly as health and education or investment in these areas can be utterly wasted. 

If the UK doubles down on its strengths, namely by galvanising a uniquely united public and cross party political willingness to stand up to authoritarianism, expanding its navy and air force, supporting the JEF and Poland in Europe, reinforcing sovereign overseas territories to project power at choke points around the world, partially re-industrialising and building up ammunition stockpiles, and forging standing forces with its Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (CANZUK) allies, the UK can once again become a leader of the liberal democracies of the world. The challenge is choosing to do so and taking the decisive action needed. The British public and government departments, especially the Treasury, need to collectively start recognising the value their armed forces again and the benefits they bring in securing economic prosperity and crisis resilience. The main question the Government and wider public must then answer is how to pay for this from existing budgets or raising taxes to guarantee the security of the Western way of life and the British economy. Ultimately, the UK can afford to expand its military, and if it wishes to protect the world order which ensures its prosperity and way of life, it must.  

Focusing on our strengths by prioritising naval and aerospace power. Britain has never been a land power in peacetime, it shouldn’t try to be now. 

The UK should in the first instance ensure that it can hold back a peer enemy on its own through the

building up of its naval and aerospace power, i.e. increasing the producing long-lead time items of

ships and airframes, while retaining sufficient weapon stockpiles and land forces training facilities

to enable the rapid expansion of the army if necessary. A maritime-focused defence posture has historically

allowed Britain to keep the enemy at bay away from British shores, securing and controlling trade

routes, blockading the enemy, and buying time to support allies with essential supplies and funds,

while expanding its own ground forces. This strategy was repeatedly successful for Britain in conflicts

against Habsburg Spain to Napoleonic France, Tsarist Russia and Nazi Germany, and is likely to remain

successful even with the advent of new technologies such as advanced drones. Moreover, with the

emergence of grey-zone threats such as Wagner and other PMCs, an enhanced presence in naval and

aerospace power would permit the UK and its allies to more easily interdict or if necessary, strike

Russian subversion operations and hostile actions in locations such as the Sahel, or to eliminate or

isolate Russian overseas military bases such as in Syria in the event of conflict.

Even at the height of British hegemony in the 1800s, its army was considered small by European standards, being dismissed by Otto Von Bismarck who is said to have exclaimed that if it were to land on German shores, he would send a policeman to arrest it. If the UK can maintain a qualitive edge and numerical parity, ideally superiority, in air and sea power, its ability to remain in a fight with a superior land power is assured regardless of the commitment of NATO allies. As has been demonstrated in the war in Ukraine, land forces can be raised rapidly, with the UK showing an excellent ability to train tens of thousands of foreign troops in a short space of time, while it is equipment which can take years to produce and expertise to maintain which is the main bottleneck in a nation’s ability to fight a war of survival. Equal focus on all three forces at the cost of losing air and sea dominance in a future war risks blockade, siege and starvation of the UK, and the neutering of any land forces without need of a fight as they become marooned in the UK.  

To add mass to the Royal Navy and RAF in a timely and cost-effective way, production should be increased of proven but still high-quality and reliable designs, namely increasing the current order of Type 31 Frigates, themselves based on an established Danish design, and the latest version of the Eurofighter Typhoon. This would avoid the common cost over-runs and delays experienced with new designs and add the depth and resilience to complement the most technologically advanced equipment in Britain’s arsenal such as Type 26 frigates and the F-35 fighters. 

While the UK is often described as a declining power and derided in the Western media as being unable to afford its existing military capabilities, it should be noted that while only spending 2% of its GDP on defence, it retains a high-quality selection of most military capabilities from advanced main battle tanks and fighter jets to nuclear armed and powered submarines. One must wonder what influence the UK could have on the world if it spent closer to 3% or 4% on defence as it did during the cold war, and which nations such as Poland are now moving towards.  

On the current government planning and valuing investment in defence. 

 The UK Government has already begun a shift towards a more expeditionary defence posture with an increased focus on the Pacific while retaining a strong presence in eastern and northern Europe, as well as around key choke points in the world. This is exemplified by the development of the Littoral Response Groups North and South, expansion of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the forward basing of offshore patrol vessels in key locations around the world. The recent AUKUS agreement with the United States and Australia also strengthens British ties with the Anglosphere and increasing its presence in the far east. While the intent is clear to provide an enduring presence in multiple locations around the world, this has not been met with the conviction to invest. Conversely, should the British Government build on these foundations and expand the forward basing from single OPVs to flotillas of frigates for example, then it could once again deter aggression against allied democracies, protect the sea lanes, provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters, and enhance Britain’s influence around the world. The will of the British Government to use the Royal Navy in this manner has been exemplified recently with the protection of commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the simultaneous announcement to deploy an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) to Guyana in the face of Venezuelan threats. A decisive statement of intent from the British Government could be the increasing the current order of general-purpose Type 31 frigates for example from five to fifteen, greatly enhancing Britain’s escort fleet, allowing forward basing, and allowing the amphibious and aircraft carrier task forces to reinforce areas with existing British security presence. While expensive, this would at a stroke significantly outmatch anything the Russian navy is able to project around the world and would free up the anti-submarine Type 26 frigates to focus on bottling up Russian nuclear submarines of the Russian Northern Fleet. However, at a per-unit cost of around £250 Million for a Type 31 frigate, the British Government and public should be encouraged to see the value of such a long-term and visible tool of British influence and advertisement of British manufacturing ability. This is especially clear when compared to apparently affordable programmes such as the ongoing COVID inquiry or the Rwanda migrant plan which are already projected to run into the hundreds of millions of pounds but with little or no tangible output or impact.  

The British army is currently at its smallest size in two centuries at around seventy thousand regular

troops. The current strategy of the British Government is to focus on a leaner, more lethal and

expeditionary-focused army. Provided that this force is properly resourced alongside an expanded navy

and air force it should be able to provide support in strength to our allies in specific theatres with the

ability to mobilise rapidly. The UK has recognised that compared to the cold war where the large but

still outnumbered British Army of the Rhine would be responsible for a small stretch of German

territory in the event of a war with the USSR, even with a significantly larger army, with the logistical

and financial burden it brings, it would still fall short against Russia in the current landscape in Europe and a NATO-Russia border of over one thousand five hundred miles. In a division of labour between

land, air and sea-focused powers within NATO or other UK allies, the expeditionary-focused British

army would be a lethal precision missile to be fired by the Royal Navy or RAF to specific strategic

locations, leading an attack or to blunt enemy breakthroughs. The British Government is right to

continue with this overall strategy in theory even with the current war in Ukraine which resembles

World War One with drones, more than the conflicts theorised by Western policy makers up to 2021.

By focusing resources on a navy and air force stronger and more capable than that of Russia, the UK

would retain its influence internationally despite a smaller army, would be able to intervene quicker

and decisively in multiple theatres at once and at short notice. This would also avoid getting bogged

down in modern trench warfare which would be the only recourse if the British Army was expanded

instead. That being said, as discussed above, the British Government should still invest in munitions

and weapons stocks, as well as the engineering, logistics and training infrastructure to expand the army

if required and if Britain finds itself in total war, for example if NATO were to collapse and Britain were

at war with Russia. Therefore, in part, the UK has taken the right course for the British forces

by focusing on a more lethal and expeditionary army in theory, but with the perennial issue of not

funding its ambitions with the resources needed, and without an expanded navy and air force to secure

the seas and skies, it appears stingy and too reliant on American support. The UK should also avoid a

knee-jerk reaction of using the war in Ukraine with its focus on drone warfare as an example of how

modern war should be fought, and it needs to be recognised that while drones must be an ever more

important part of war on land sea and air, the current way of war in Ukraine is one in which neither

side has air dominance and one may wonder whether drones would be having the same impact if

either side had unmatched control of the air and were able to strike the drone command and control

centres.

Pillars of the West, moving away from the USA Hub and Spoke model of defence through new alliances; CANZUK and the combined Royal Navies, JEF and Poland. 

While the UK should invest enough in its defence to be able to stand alone against an adversary such as Russia and hold it at bay in the air and at sea, it should aim to completely outmatch any aggressor outside its own back yard by joining with the CANZUK nations. The CANZUK concept is usually seen in an economic perspective as an EU analogue, but the military approach may be the easiest to apply as unlike with economic policy where the four nations can differ, they all align in their defence and foreign policy interests with common rivals in Russia and China. The establishment of CANZUK as a military alliance, principally through the the unifying of the four Royal Navies into a single adaptable force with standing fleets across the globe, would strengthen the influence of each member nation and would serve as a global protector of democracy. While the alliance members are geographically separated by great distance, the focus on the strengthening of their own and combined naval fleets would ensure their lines of communication, with the British Overseas Territories acting as defensible connectors between them. Therefore, the combining of British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand forces would appear to provide the most reliable guarantee of long-term defence policy alignment and arguably it makes more sense to invest in this compared to other alliances. These nations currently share a head of state (though should this change in future with abolition of the monarchy in one or more members, it should not impact the alliance), a common language, aligned foreign policy, a shared heritage, similar military structure and common values such as a belief in fairness, justice, multiculturalism and liberal democracy. They like Britain share similar political systems which exhibit cross-party support for defending the rules-based order and challenging Russian aggression against Ukraine, unlike key NATO allies The USA, France and Germany. Importantly, with the establishment of a CANZUK alliance, it would be necessary to make clear that unlike with the British Empire of old, or the current US hub and spokes alliances, this would be an alliance of equals, with each member bringing unique abilities and resources to the group. The alliances through their home and overseas territories and bases, would provide simultaneous regional control or influence over key choke points and trade routes such as in the straits of Gibraltar, and eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, North Atlantic, GIUK gap, Caribbean, Europe, North America, Oceania and the Pacific and emerging areas of competition such as the Arctic, Northwest passage, and Antarctica. Even the United States would currently struggle to achieve such reach without the support of one or more of the CANZUK nations. In terms of the military basis for a CANZUK alliance, the members already share key military platforms such as the F-35 fighter, the upcoming Type 26 Frigate, and planned AUKUS class submarines ensuring commonality of procedures and the ability to share personnel and equipment. The CANZUK nations would also be well placed to collaborate on space technology such as an independent satellite surveillance system.  

Since the end of WW2 Canada and Australia have become increasingly powerful in their own right with technologically advanced and highly trained forces, and they would be as capable as Britain as acting as regional leaders of the alliance. A maritime and air focus on integration and the establishment of joint forces could be founded on a core of unified Royal Navies fleets consisting of major surface combatants and submarines from all four Navies, namely a Northern fleet (led by Canada), European fleet (led by the UK) and a Southern/Pacific fleet (Led by Australia and New Zealand). This would provide a strong power-projection and sea denial ability across the globe which would be strengthened and connected by sovereign British overseas territory bases. This has arguably been tentatively trialled by the British Government with the permanent forward basing of offshore patrol vessels in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, Pacific, and Atlantic. While not a significant military force on their own, the vessels provide a permanent presence and ability to influence diplomatic efforts in a region and potentially deter aggression, exemplified by the recent announcement of the deployment of HMS Tamar to Guyana to aid this Commonwealth nation in the face of Venezuelan threats. If these OPVs were to be replaced by flotillas, squadrons or fleets, the UK/CANZUK alliance would have a credible conventional deterrent and response ability around the world, enabling it to prevent regional conflict or disruption to resource centres and supply routes, at a time of increasing instability and supply chain vulnerability.  

In Northern Europe, the Joint Expeditionary Force, led by Britain and composed of like-minded

European nations with advanced if not particularly large militaries, offers the UK a willing and proactive

alliance to keep Russia at bay. Unlike France and Germany, the JEF has largely been consistent in

recognising the threat from Russia, and along with Poland should be prioritised by Britain in developing

an organic alternative to the American centred hub-and-spoke model of European defence. A

particular strategic advantage of strengthening the JEF is the continued pressure that would be exerted

on Russia, particularly in its northwest with both its Baltic and Northern Fleets being threatened by

the proximity of the JEF nations. By strengthening this force and demonstrating independence from

the US military, the UK will enhance its influence, bolster its eastern and northern defences, and make

it less likely the US abandon Europe citing its unwillingness to defend itself.

Poland which is rapidly expanding its defence budget, defence industry and the overall size of its military, focusing primarily on its army, and as such is likely to become Europe’s primary land power. While the UK should not aim to emulate this land-forces expansion, such an increase in defence expenditure but focused on its naval and air power would complement powerful allied land powers in Europe such as a strengthened Poland. One can imagine a scenario within the next six years where an isolationist United States and a pro-Putin France withdraw from NATO, the burden of security in Europe would fall on nations with both the strength, and the willingness to employ that strength to stand against Russia, should it take the opportunity of a doubtful collective defence to attack Eastern Europe. It would be for nations such as the UK and Poland to fulfil this role, as while Germany is economically strong, its willingness to use its military and industrial power to face down Russia and a conflict is less certain. 

Regrettably, the same polarising populist and potentially pro-Putin forces influencing the Republican supporting American public are also gaining ground in Britain’s closest and most powerful European allies. One can speculate that NATO’s de facto willingness to stand against Russian aggression may be entirely nullified should Rassemblement National or Alternative für Deutschland gain power in France or Germany respectively. Such an eventuality would provide an opportunity for Russia, seething with resentment for Western support in Ukraine, to attack individual NATO or non-NATO allies of Britain, or even Britain itself if it seemed unlikely that a triggering of Article 5 would elicit a meaningful response. Therefore, the UK should invest in the strengthening in its alliances with the other CANZUK nations, guaranteeing their defence in exchange of a reciprocal agreement. The nations of the Joint Expeditionary Force offer another route for Britain and show how the UK has already made tentative steps to being able to fight hand in hand with proactive European partners outside of a purely NATO framework.  

With the UK’s traditional allies in Western Europe, the peace dividend has become an addiction which

few of the major powers are able to shake. This is especially the case with France and Germany, the

two nations which should be the most invested in European defence. France under Emanuel Macron

proclaims its desire for Europe to become self-sufficient in defence and independent from US foreign

policy, however it fails to back this up with the funding needed to demonstrate that Europe can in fact

defend itself. Currently, France provides less persistent military support to NATO and the EU’s eastern

flank than either the United States or the UK, despite neither being EU members. Simultaneously,

France provides the least support to Ukraine of the major Western powers on a per capita or gross figure basis, despite the victory of Ukraine and the weakening of Russia’s military clearly being in the

interests of France and its vision for Europe. Indeed, French actions in Europe and towards Russia are

self-defeating. By failing to increase its military commitment to European defence within or outside of

NATO, it makes Europe more dependent on the United States and vulnerable to Russian attack. The

naiveté of Macron’s France is clear to see from its trust in Putin up to 24th February 2022 over their

allies the US and UK on the impending invasion, and their commitment to negotiation with Russia and

the flawed Normandy Peace Format. France has also appeared blind to the direct threat posed

by Russia which continues to undermine French influence in North Africa by supporting coups and

stoking anti-French sentiment. This French weakness in the face of Russian aggression against Europe

with a poor commitment to supporting Ukraine, an inability to counter Russian influence in Africa, and

the rising popularity of far-right pro Putin political parties in France makes the idea of an Entente

Cordial 2.0 an unlikely supplement or replacement for NATO. 

On building public buy-in, the opportunities of rearmament-led reindustrialisation and benefits to the economy. 

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that even in the 21st century, if one is to fight a war against a determined peer or near-peer enemy, large stockpiles of traditional munitions are required. While the Western world has tried to ramp up production to both feed the Ukrainian armed forces and replenish their own dwindling stocks, the cost to produce 155 mm and 105 mm has risen greatly in response to market demand. To address the demand for larger stocks of less high-tech munitions and consumables required for large-scale warfare in an economic manner, the UK should consider the re-establishment of Royal Ordnance Factories which can focus on the large-scale production of shells and 105 mm and 155 mm barrels, bullets and potentially small arms, allowing the major arms developers to prioritise production of high-tech equipment where innovation should be focused. Not only would this enable the UK to expand its stockpile of munitions available for large-scale warfare, but it would enable the UK to support democracies more readily around the world threatened by aggressive authoritarian neighbours. Depending on the size and number of these newly established government-run factories, the UK would have the opportunity to reindustrialise and onshore production of essential strategic equipment. At a time when the concept of globalisation is under threat and supply-lines are becoming increasingly vulnerable, the reestablishment of ROFs in former industrial towns in across the UK would provide a nucleus around which trades can be relearned, and agglomeration of other private industries encouraged. One can imagine a decisive British Government investing in a new deal for Britain by reinvigorating industries, with defence manufacturing at its core in the more deprived towns and cities of the UK where a disproportionate amount of welfare budget is currently spent and where initiatives are failing to bridge the North-South Divide. Should the British Government provide direct investment to reintroduce this industry into post-industrial towns and cities, one could potentially reduce the welfare burden on the country. This may be one route for the UK to convert its current peace dividend into direct defence investment and benefit the UK economy at the same time. 

This commentary does not presuppose how the British Government would find the funds to invest into a greater defence budget, but it is likely that if the need was communicated as a non-partisan, cross-party initiative it would gather public support and buy-in. Funds could ideally be found from reduced welfare expenditure resulting from higher employment in re-industrialised towns, or reallocating overseas aid funds on the condition that the British Armed Forces provide humanitarian support globally. Alternatively, dedicated income or wealth taxes for security and defence could be implemented, with those who have the most to lose from a collapse in the western financial and rules based system, i.e. the wealthiest citizens and large corporations, being expected to bear the greater burden. It would be for imaginative and determined politicians and civil servants to mobilise the nation and the public across the full mainstream political spectrum with the tools at their disposal.  

On the war in Ukraine. 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dispelled in one go two long held myths, first the idea that conventional large-scale warfare was no longer possible in Europe and second, that Russia’s armed forces were worthy of the title of second most powerful in the world. The war has so far demonstrated the weakness of the Russian Air force which despite being large and technologically advanced on paper, has been unable to establish air superiority over their much smaller neighbour. However, as Britain should recognise its historical strength in being a maritime power, Russia has once again recognised that its greatest strength is in employing its huge manpower advantage, regardless of the cost. The latter point should come as a warning to the West, that Russia does not have the same rationality and that the West should therefore brace itself to stand up to an irrational actor which is not afraid to lose large parts of its population in the act of securing its political goals. However, the poor performance of Russia’s military and the success of western weaponry over it should be reassuring to the West, that if they can add mass to their superior technology, the Russian manpower advantage could be neutered through the steel-not-flesh approach. Indeed, one could pose the question of how successful Russia’s defensive fortifications would have been in 2023’s Ukrainian counter offensive, had Western fighter jets, SEAD systems and long-range attack missiles been offered to Ukraine in 2022. The West has a golden opportunity at this moment to supply advanced equipment in sufficient numbers to Ukraine to eliminate as much Russian military potential as possible. Doing so would be an invest-to-save initiative, with each Russian tank destroyed reducing Russia’s potential to do harm to Europe and delaying any future war as it repairs or produces new equipment and trains new troops, as the West rearms. The cost to Europe of not investing the comparatively low sums of money into giving Ukraine the mass and technological edge now will ultimately be measured not in percent of a national budget or dollars per capita, but in the lives of their own civilians and soldiers if the irrational and vengeful Russians defeat Ukraine and continue their advance to revise the post-Cold War order.  

The West must maintain its support, and as recently highlighted by the new Polish Foreign minister, the only nation with a right to feel fatigued is Ukraine who is fighting every day and spending blood to protect Europe, while Europe only spends minimum amounts of money and sends mainly their older equipment to Ukraine. When compared to the very real, high-intensity warfare being fought by Ukrainian men and women, and the atrocities against civilians in Ukraine, Western fatigue is not justified, and what we see is Western indifference, boredom, geopolitical naiveté, and failure to learn from the lessons of the past or to foresee the risks which could emerge in the future should Ukraine lose the war. The UK’s support for Ukraine both before the invasion and after it has demonstrated the UK’s ability to lead the Western nations, and above all showed its determination to use the resources it has to stand against authoritarianism. The UK has repeatedly called the Kremlin’s bluff by crossing supposed red lines than even the United States would not cross first, for example with the provision of Challenger 2 MBTs and long-range Storm Shadow Cruise Missiles. Indeed, it is this cross-party and general public support for proactively supporting democracies with its military expertise and resources that is arguably Britain’s greatest strength, and if the resources were increased, Britain’s influence could be enhanced greatly, and the Western World protected. The UK’s support along with that of the US for Ukraine, primarily with the provision of training and advanced anti-tank missile systems, albeit at the cost of significantly reducing the UK’s own stocks, was a key factor in Ukraine’s ability to blunt the Russian invasion and enabling Ukraine to survive into the current attritional phase of warfare at huge cost to Russian military strength. The UK has not yet capitalised on the opportunity for its industry to expand the production of demonstrably successful weapons such as the NLAW antitank missile, with only funding to replace the donated stocks currently allocated. On the contrary, if the UK makes a clear statement of intent to be a leader and an arsenal of the western world by greatly increasing the production of advanced weapon systems to donate to Ukraine, strengthen democratic partners and its own armed forces, the current go-to bargaining chip of authoritarian regimes, their large standing armies, will be significantly weakened. 

In terms of the current situation in Ukraine and the output of western investment and support for their defence, Ukraine itself has been criticised in recent months for not being able to break through Russian lines in a counterattack despite Western funding, training and equipment. But Western politicians especially seem oblivious to the fact that their own armies would never be expected to advance on fortified positions without first securing overwhelming control of the skies. Ukraine should be praised for holding back the second largest army on Earth, in the face of inconceivable odds for two years and for rolling back Russia’s occupation significantly in 2022. One should compare this with the fall of France in a matter of weeks despite being on a much more even footing when compared to Nazi Germany in WW2. It is in this light that we should praise Ukrainian successes so far, and invest properly in their defence, recognise the threat to Europe and the western world now and in the future, and wake ourselves up from the post-Cold War peace fallacy.  

Achievable, decisive actions the UK could take.

The UK must re-prioritise defence spending and recognise the value of a strong military to the defence of the western world, the enhancing of the UK’s influence on the international stage, protecting the trade routes and stable financial systems on which our economy depends, and reinvigorating the UK’s manufacturing base with rearmament as a nucleation point. The reestablishment of the Royal Ordnance Factories in the post-industrial towns of Britain could serve as a catalyst with this and provide the government with the means to mass produce at lower cost the less high-tech munitions such as artillery shells which have become prohibitively expensive on the global arms market.  

The UK must focus on being a sea and air power by expanding the Royal Navy and RAF while building the infrastructure needed to expand and equip the army rapidly if required. This should be achieved by increasing orders of ships under production with the proven Type 31 Frigate design offering a high-quality, lower cost and low risk option for the Royal Navy, while re-ordering the already in service Eurofighter Typhoon in its newest variant offers the same advantages in terms of good value, high-quality and low risk to the RAF. These platforms would add mass to both services and complement the higher quality but more expensive equipment being procured for both forces. While there will undoubtedly be challenges in recruiting and training the required personnel, these must not be seen as a bottleneck in producing the required equipment, as the war in Ukraine demonstrates, equipment production and procurement in a time of crisis is much more difficult than recruitment. By adopting this approach, the UK will be able to maximise its value to NATO by complementing the land-focused allies in Europe and allow it stand on its own as a global military power in multiple theatres simultaneously. 

The UK should formalise a military alliance with the like-minded and policy aligned CANZUK nations with the combined Royal Navies at its core. This action would at a stroke bring into being a strong, world-class, and large naval force with global power projection, sea denial and trade route protection abilities. Currently while viewed in the context of the US hub-and-spokes model, the respective CANZUK nations are seen as isolated without US support and less powerful than the sum of their parts. Bringing them together into one naval power would provide a stable guarantor of Western power with global reach second only to the United States. This compares with the rising naval power of China, which while large in number is unlikely to achieve the same basing infrastructure in multiple oceans that the CANZUK nations would instantly provide. The combined CANZUK Royal Navy would be both large and capable, with large and light aircraft/helicopter carriers, nuclear and diesel powered submarines, amphibious assault ships and a significant number of escort vessels and through the UK component a strategic nuclear deterrent which could be offered as an umbrella to the CANZUK nations if they wished. By establishing multiple standing fleets in strategic locations around the world led by the respective regional nations and which could mutually reinforce one another, the CANZUK navy would have the ability to provide continuous sea control around the world and could rapidly respond to emerging crises with enlarged task groups much more easily than any one nation alone. The Type 26 frigates currently ordered or under construction in various guises for the UK, Canadian and Australian Royal Navies offers a golden opportunity to establish a nucleus of commonality within the CANZUK navies and would be a good starting point for building cross-crewing and further standardising already similar procedures and training.  

The UK must build on successes with the JEF in Europe and Establish strengthen ties with Poland to move away from overdependence on the US hub-and-spokes model of alliances. Doing so would secure Britain’s eastern and northern flanks, encourage the United States to remain invested in European defence by reducing the perception of willing overdependence on them, and also provide a backstop of independent defence should the worst-case scenario of the US pulling back from NATO commitments.  

Major political parties should agree a common defence policy to provide long-term planning and stability. Unlike in the United States, France and Germany, the major UK political parties almost unanimously support continued support for Ukraine, reflected also in public opinion. This is similarly the case with other CANZUK members and major Ukraine supporters Australia and Canada. Such rare consensus in the political landscape should be seized upon by the British Parliament and applied to the development of a non-partisan common defence and security policy which is decoupled from the normal political battlefield and instead geared towards the national good, security and prosperity. Considering that most defence contracts last much longer than a typical government, this would provide the assurance and stability needed to expand and sustain our world-class defence industry, securing Britain’s defences and expanding its manufacturing sector at a time of re-industrialization and onshoring for the benefit of deprived post-industrial areas.  

The UK has yet to cash in on reversing its peace dividend from the end of the Cold War. As Russian aggression rises and American dominance wanes in the world, we must be prepared to invest significant sums once again in our own defence and that of the rules-based world order, on which our security and prosperity depends. Contrary to the common perception that the UK can’t afford its current military commitments, it is largely by choice that the UK only spends the NATO minimum 2% of its GDP on defence, meaning it has room to expand. This is largely a political decision in Whitehall to save money in the short term, but as Britain is acutely vulnerable to disruption in global supply chains, inadequate investment in the military, particularly in sea power will ultimately be much more costly in the long run. The UK must now prepare for the worst-case scenarios which are becoming more likely as the 2020s roll on, that America will eventually renege on its post-WW2 commitment to defend Europe and the seas on which we depend, that our French and German allies elect pro-Putin leaders, and ultimately that the NATO alliance may collapse. The UK Government, parliament and public must work together to face this non-partisan existential threat. As an island nation, the UK must again focus on its strengths and prioritise maritime and aerospace power by significantly expanding its navy and air force to allow it to stand alone against an adversary such as Russia. It must also expand its munition stocks and strengthen alliances with nations which share its will to stand up for Western values. We can build on our existing partnerships with the nations of the Joint Expeditionary Force in Northern Europe and an increasingly self-confident Poland in Eastern Europe whose land forces focus would be complemented and supported by our maritime and air focus. Finally, a CANZUK alliance with the unified Royal Navies at its core would provide a powerful Western force able to persistently project power, protect sea lanes and control choke points around the world, potentially hindering the expansion of irredentist and authoritarian China and Russia. If the UK can enact these decisive changes, it will become a key pillar of the western world along with our allies, rather than being simply spokes in the US hub-and-spokes alliance model, with increasing American ire for footing the bill. In turn, by pulling our own weight we would maximise the likelihood that allies such as the United States continue to contribute to a unified Western World’s security. Failing this, it would allow us to stand without the USA against the rise of authoritarianism and the new shadow of a post-NATO, post-Pax Americana world. What other choice do we have?